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Gaudapada's
Philosophy
Gaudapada
was the first philosopher of the Advaita Vedanta school.
This article, written by the author of a standard academic
history of Indian philosophy, summarizes Gaudapada's
views.
By
SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA
Excerpted
from A History of Indian Philosophy Volume I,
Chapter X. A current edition can be ordered from
South Asia
Books.
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IT IS USELESS I THINK to attempt to bring out the meaning
of the Vedanta thought as contained in the Brahma-sutras
without making any reference to the commentary of Sankara
or any other commentator. There is reason to believe
that the Brahma-sutras were first commented upon
by some Vaisnava writers who held some form of modified
dualism.1 There
have been more than a half dozen Vaisnava commentators
of the Brahma-sutras who not only differed from
Sankara's interpretation, but also differed largely
amongst themselves in accordance with the different
degrees of stress they laid on the different aspects
of their dualistic creeds. Every one of them claimed
that his interpretation was the only one that was faithful
to the sutras and to the Upanisads. Should I attempt
to give an interpretation myself and claim that to be
the right one, it would be only just one additional
view. But however that may be, I am myself inclined
to believe that the dualistic interpretations of the
Brahmasutras were probably more faithful to the sutras
than the interpretations of Sankara.
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Srimadbhagavadgita, which itself was a work of
the Ekanti (singularistic) Vaisnavas, mentions the Brahma-sutras
as having the same purport as its own, giving cogent reasons.2
Professor Jacobi
in discussing the date of the philosophical sutras of
the Hindus has shown that the references to Buddhism found
in the Brahma-sutras are not with regard to the
Vijñanavada of Vasubandhu, but with regard to the
Sunyavada, but he regards the composition of the Brahma-sutras
to be later than Nagarjuna. I agree with the late Dr S.
C. Vidyabhushana in holding that both the Yogacara system
and the system of Nagarjuna evolved from the Prajnaparamita.3
Nagarjuna's
merit consisted in the dialectical form of his arguments
in support of Sunyavada; but so far as the essentials
of Sunyavada are concerned I believe that the Tathata
philosophy of Asvaghosa and the philosophy of the Prajnaparamita
contained no less. There is no reason to suppose
that the works of Nagarjuna were better known to the Hindu
writers than the Mahayana sutras. Even in such
later times as that of Vacaspati Misra, we find him quoting
a passage of the Salistambha sutra to give an account
of the Buddhist doctrine of pratityasamutpada.4
We
could interpret any reference to Sunyavada as pointing
to Nagarjuna only if his special phraseology or dialectical
methods were referred to in any way. On the other hand,
the reference in the Bhagavadgita to the Brahma-sutras
clearly points out a date prior to that of Nagarjuna;
though we may be slow to believe such an early date as
has been assigned to the Bhagavadgita by Telang,
yet I suppose that its date could safely be placed so
far back as the first half of the first century B.C. or
the last part of the second century B.C. The Brahma-sutras
could thus be placed slightly earlier than the date of
the Bhagavadgita. I do not know of any evidence
that would come in conflict with this supposition. The
fact that we do not know of any Hindu writer who held
such monistic views as Gaudapada or Sankara and who interpreted
the Brahma-sutras in accordance with those monistic
ideas, when combined with the fact that the dualists had
been writing commentaries on the Brahma-sutras,
goes to show that the Brahma-sutras were originally
regarded as an authoritative work of the dualists. This
also explains the fact that the Bhagavadgita, the
canonical work of the Ekanti Vaisnavas, should refer to
it. I do not know of any Hindu writer previous to Gaudapada
who attempted to give an exposition of the monistic doctrine
(apart from the Upanisads), either by writing a commentary
as did Sankara, or by writing an independent work as did
Gaudapada. I am inclined to think therefore that as the
pure monism of the Upanisads was not worked out in a coherent
manner for the formation of a monistic system, it was
dealt with by people who had sympathies with some form
of dualism which was already developing in the later days
of the Upanisads, as evidenced by the dualistic tendencies
of such Upanisads as the Svetasvatara, and the like. The
epic Samkya was also the result of this dualistic development.
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seems that Badaryana, the writer of the Brama-sutras,
was probably more a theist, than an absolutist like his
commentator Sankara. Gaudapada seems to be the most important
man, after the Upanisad sages, who revived the monistic
tendencies of the Upanisads in a bold and clear form and
tried to formulate them in a systematic manner. It seems
very significant that no other karikas on the Upanisads
were interpreted, except the Mandukyakarika by
Gaudapada, who did not himself make any reference to any
other writer of the monistic school, not even Badardyana.
Sankara himself makes the confession that the absolutist
(advaita) creed was recovered from the Vedas by
Gaudapada. Thus at the conclusion of his commentary on
Gaudapada's karika, he says that "he adores by falling
at the feet of that great guru (teacher) the adored of
his adored, who on finding all the people sinking in the
ocean made dreadful by the crocodiles of rebirth, out
of kindness for all people, by churning the great ocean
of the Veda by his great churning rod of wisdom recovered
what lay deep in the heart of the Veda, and is hardly
attainable even by the immortal gods."5 It
seems particularly significant that Sankara should credit
Gaudapada and not Badarayana with recovering the the Upanisad
creed. Gaudapada was the teacher of Govinda, the teacher
of Sankara; but he was probably living when Sankara was
a student, for Sankara says that he was directly influenced
by his great wisdom, and also speaks of the learning,
self-control and modesty of the other pupils of Gaudapada.6
There is some dispute about the date of Sankara, but accepting
the date proposed by Bhandarkar, Pathak and Deussen, we
may consider it to be 788 A.D.,7 and suppose
that in order to be able to teach Sankara, Gaudapada must
have been living till at least 800 A.D. |
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Gaudapada
thus flourished after all the great Buddhist teachers
Asvaghosa, Nagarjuna, Asanga and Vasubandhu; and I believe
that there is sufficient evidence in his karikas for
thinking that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and
considered that the teachings of the Upanisads tallied
with those of Buddha. Thus at the beginning of the fourth
chapter of his karikas he says that he adores that great
man (dvipadam varam) who by knowledge as wide
as the sky realized (sambuddha) that all appearances
(dharma) were like the vacuous sky (gaganopamam8).
He then goes on to say that he adores him who has dictated
(desita) that the touch of untouch (asparsayoga
-- probably referring to Nirvana) was the good that
produced happiness to all being, and that he was neither
in disagreement with this doctrine nor found any contradiction
in it (avivadah aviruddhasca). Some disputants
hold that coming into being is of existents, whereas
others quarrelling with them hold that being (jata)
is of non-existents (abhutasya); there are others
who quarrel with them and say that neither the existents
nor non-existents are liable to being and there is one
non-coming-into-being (advayamajatim). He agrees
with those who hold that there is no coming into being.9
In IV. 19 of his karika he again says that the Buddhas
have shown that there was no coming into being in any
way (sarvatha Buddhairajatih paridipitah).
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in IV. 42 he says that it was for those realists (vastuvadi),
who since they found things and could deal with them and
were afraid of non-being, that the Buddhas had spoken
of origination (jati). In IV. 90 he refers to agrayana
which we know to be a name of Mahayana. Again,
in IV. 98 and 99 he says that all appearances are pure
and vacuous by nature. These the Buddhas, the emancipated
one (mukta) and the leaders know first. It was
not said by the Buddha that all appearances (dharma)
were knowledge. He then closes the karikas with an adoration
which in all probability also refers to the Buddha.10 |
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Gaudapada's
work is divided into four chapters: (I) Agama (scripture),
(2) Vaitathya (unreality), (3) Advaita (unity), (4)
Alatasant (the extinction of the burning coal). The
first chapter is more in the way of explaining the Mandukya
Upanisad by virtue of which the entire work is known
as Mandukyakarika. The second, third, and fourth
chapters are the constructive parts of Gaudapada's work,
not particularly connected with the Mandukya Upanisad.
In
the first chapter Gaudapada begins with the three apparent
manifestations of the self: (I) as the experiencer of
the external world while we are awake (visva
or vaisvanara atma), (2) as the experiencer in
the dream state (taijasa atma), (3) as the experiencer
in deep sleep (susupti), called the prajña
when there is no determinate knowledge, but pure consciousness
and pure bliss (ananda). He who knows these three
as one is never attached to his experiences. Gaudapada
then enumerates some theories of creation: some think
that the world has proceeded as a creation from the
prana (vital activity), others consider creation as
an expansion (vibhuti) of that cause from which
it has proceeded; others imagine that creation is like
dream (svapna) and magic (maya); others,
that creation proceeds simply by the will of the Lord;
others that it proceeds from time; others that it is
for the enjoyment of the Lord (bhogartham) or
for his play only (kridartham), for such is the
nature (svabhava) of the Lord, that he creates,
but he cannot have any longing, as all his desires are
in a state of fulfilment.
Gaudapada
does not indicate his preference one way or the other,
but describes the fourth state of the self as unseen
(adrsta), unrelationable (avyavaharyam),
ungraspable (agrahyam), indefinable (alaksana),
unthinkable (acintyam), unspeakable (avyapadeskya),
the essence as oneness with the self (ekatmapratyayasara),
as the extinction of the appearance (prapancopasama),
the quiescent (santam), the good (sivam),
the one (advaita).11 The world-appearance
(prapanca) would have ceased if it had existed,
but, all this duality is mere maya (magic or illusion),
the one is the ultimately real (paramaarthatah).
In the second chapter Gaudapada says that what is meant
by calling the world a dream is that all existence is
unreal. That which neither exists in the beginning nor
in the end cannot be said to exist in the present. Being
like unreal it appears as real. The appearance has a
beginning and an end and is therefore false. In dreams
things are imagined internally, and in the experience
that we have when we are awake things are imagined as
if existing outside, but both of them are but illusory
creations of the self. What is perceived in the mind
is perceived as existing at the moment of perception
only; external objects are supposed to have two moments
of existence (namely before they are perceived, and
when they begin to be perceived), but this is all mere
imagination. That which is unmanifested in the mind
and that which appears as distinct and manifest outside
are all imaginary productions in association with the
sense faculties. There is first the imagination of a
perceiver or soul (jiva) and then along with
it the imaginary creations of diverse inner states and
the external world. Just as in darkness the rope is
imagined to be a snake, so the self is also imagined
by its own illusion in diverse forms. There is neither
any production nor any destruction (na nirodho, na
cotpattih), there is no one who is enchained, no
one who is striving, no one who wants to be released.12
Imagination finds itself realized in the non-existent
existents and also in the sense [p. 426] of unity; all
imagination either as the many or the one (advaya) is
false; it is only the oneness (advayata) that is good.
There is no many, nor are things different or non-different
(na nanedam... na prthag naprthak).13 The
sages who have transcended attachment, fear, and anger
and have gone beyond the depths of the Vedas have perceived
it as the imaginationless cessation of all appearance
(nirvikalpah prapancopasamah), the one.14
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In
the third chapter Gaudapada says that truth is like
the void (akasa) which is falsely conceived as
taking part in birth and death, coming and going and
as existing in all bodies; but howsoever it be conceived,
it is all the while not different from akasa. All things
that appear as compounded are but dreams (svapna)
and maya (magic). Duality is a distinction imposed upon
the one (advaita) by maya. The truth is immortal,
it cannot therefore by its own nature suffer change.
It has no birth. All birth and death, all this manifold
is but the result of an imposition of maya upon it.15
One mind appears as many in the dream, so also
in the waking state one appears as many, but when the
mind activity of the Togins (sages) is stopped arises
this fearless state, the extinction of all sorrow, final
cessation. Thinking everything to be misery (duhkham
sarvam anusmrtya) one should stop all desires and
enjoyments, and thinking that nothing has any birth
he should not see any production at all. He should awaken
the mind (citta) into its final dissolution (laya)
and pacify it when distracted, he should not move it
towards diverse objects when it stops. He should not
taste any pleasure (sukham) and by wisdom remain
unattached, by strong effort making it motionless and
still. When he neither passes into dissolution nor into
dis traction; when there is no sign, no appearance that
is the perfect Brahman. When there is no object of knowledge
to come into being, the unproduced is then called the
omniscent (sarvajna).
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the fourth chapter, called the Alatasanti, Gaudapada further
describes this final state.16 All the dharmas
(appearances) are without death or decay.17
Gaudapada then follows a dialectical form of argument
which reminds us of Nagarjuna. Gaudapada continues thus:
Those who regard karana (cause) as the karyya (effect
in a potential form) cannot consider the cause as truly
unproduced (aja), for it suffers production; how
can it be called eternal and yet changing? If it is said
that things come into being from that which has no production,
there is no example with which such a case may be illustrated.
Nor can we consider that anything is born from that which
has itself suffered production. How again can one come
to a right conclusion about the regressus ad infinitum
of cause and effect (hetu and phala)? Without
reference to the effect there is no cause, and without
reference to cause there is no effect. Nothing is born
either by itself or through others; call it either being,
non- being, or being-non-being, nothing suffers any birth,
neither the cause nor the effect is produced out of its
own nature (svabhavatah), and thus that which has
no beginning anywhere cannot be said to have a production.
All experience (prajnapti) is dependent on reasons,
for otherwise both would vanish, and there would be none
of the afflictions (samklesa) that we suffer. When
we look at all things in a connected manner they seem
to be dependent, but when we look at them from the point
of view of reality or truth the reasons cease to be reasons.
The mind (citta) does not come in touch with objects
and thereby manifest them, for since things do not exist
they are not different from their manifestations in knowledge.
It is not in any particular case that the mind produces
the manifestations of objects while they do not exist
so that it could be said to be an error, for in present,
past, and future the mind never comes in touch with objects
which only appear by reason of their diverse manifestations.
Therefore neither the mind nor the objects seen by it
are ever produced. Those who perceive them to suffer production
are really traversing the reason of vacuity (khe),
for all production is but false imposition on the vacuity.
Since the unborn is perceived as being born, the essence
then is the absence of production, for it being of the
nature of absence of production it could never change
its nature. Everything has a beginning and an end and
is therefore false. The existence of all things is like
a magical or illusory elephant (mayahasti) and
exists only as far as it merely appears or is related
to experience. There is thus the appearance of production,
movement and things, but the one knowledge (vijñana)
is the unborn, unmoved, the unthingness (avastutva),
the cessation (santam). As the movement of burning
charcoal is perceived as straight or curved, so it is
the movement (spandita) of consciousness that appears
as the perceiving and the perceived. All the attributes
(eg. straight or curved) are imposed upon the charcoal
fire, though in reality it does not possess them; so also
all the appearances are imposed upon consciousness, though
in reality they do not possess them. We could never indicate
any kind of causal relation between the consciousness
and its appearance, which are therefore to be demonstrated
as unthinkable (acintya). A thing (dravya)
is the cause of a thing (dravya), and that which
is not a thing may be the cause of that which is not a
thing, but all the appearances are neither things nor
those which are not things, so neither are appearances
produced from the mind (citta), nor is the mind
produced by appearances. So long as one thinks of cause
and effect he has to suffer the cycle of existence (samsara),
but when that notion ceases there is no samsara. All things
are regarded as being produced from a relative point of
view only (samtvrti), there is therefore nothing
permanent (sasvata). Again, no existent things
are produced, hence there cannot be any destruction (uccheda).
Appearances (dharma) are produced only apparently,
not in reality; their coming into being is like maya,
and that maya again does not exist. All appearances are
like shoots of maaic coming out of seeds of magic and
are not therefore neither eternal nor destructible. As
in dreams, or in magic, men are born and die, so are all
appearances. That which appears as existing from an imaginary
relative point of view (kalpita samvrti) is not
so in reality (paramartha), for the existence depending
on others, as shown in all relative appearance, is after
all not a real existence. That things exist, do not exist,
do exist and not exist, and neither exist nor not exist;
that they are moving or steady, or none of those, are
but thoughts with which fools are deluded. |
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is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed from the
Madhyamika doctrines, as found in the Nagarjuna's karikas
and the Vijnavada doctrines, as found in Lahkavatara,
that it is needless to attempt to prove it. Gaudapada
assimilated all the Buddhist Sunyavada and Vijñanavada
teachings, and thought that these held good of the ultimate
truth preached by the Upanisads. It is immaterial whether
he was a Hindu or a Buddhist, so long as we are sure that
he had the highest respect for the Buddha and for the
teachings which he believed to be his. Gaudapada took
the smallest Upanisads to comment upon, probably because
he wished to give his opinions unrestricted by the textual
limitations of the bigger ones. His main emphasis is on
the truth that he realized to be perfect. He only incidentally
suggested that the great Buddhist truth of indefinable
and unspeakable vijnana or vacuity would hold good of
the highest atman of the Upanisads, and thus laid the
foundation of a revival of the Upanisad studies on Buddhist
lines. How far the Upanisads guaranteed in detail the
truth of Gaudapada's views it was left for his disciple,
the great Sankara, to examine and explain. |
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Notes
1. This point will be dealt with in the 2nd volume,
when I shall deal with the systems expounded by the
Vaisnava commentators of the Brahma-sutras.
2. *"Brahmasutrapadaiscaiva
hetumadbhirviniscitah" Bhagavadgita. The proofs
in support of the view that the Bhagavadgita
is a Vaisnava work will be discussed in the 2nd volume
of the present work in the section on Bhagavadgita
and its philosophy.
3.
Indian Antiquary, 1915.
4.
See Vacaspati Misra's Bhamati on Sankara's bhasya
on Brahma-sutra, II. ii.
5.
Sankara's bhasya on Gaudapada's karika, Anandasrama
edition, p. 214.
6.
Anandasrama edition of Sankara's bhasya on Gaudapada's
karika, p.21.
7.
Telang wishes to put Sankara's date somewhere in the
8th century, and Venkatesvara would have him in 805
A.D.-897 A.D., as he did not believe that Sankara could
have lived only for 32 years. J.R.A.S. 1916.
8.
Compare Lankavatara, p. 29, Katham ca gaganopamam.
9.
Gaudapada's karika, IV. 2, 4.
10.
Gaudapada's karika, IV. 100. In my translation I have
not followed Sankara, for he has I think tried his level
best to explain away even the most obvious references
to Buddha and Buddhism in Gaudapida's karika. I have,
therefore, drawn my meaning directly as Gaudapada's
karikas seemed to indicate. I have followed the same
principle in giving the short exposition of Gaudapada's
philosophy below.
11.
Compare in Nagarjuna's first karika the idea of prapanocopasamam
sivam. Anirodhamanutpadamanucchedamasasvatam anekarthamananarthamanagamamanirgamam
yah pratityasamutpadam prapancopasamam sivam desayamasa
sambuddhastam vande vadatamvaram. Compare also Nagarjuna's
Chapter on Nirvanapariksa, Purvopalambhopasamah prapancopasamah
sivah na kvacit kasyacit kascit dharmmo buddhenadesitah.
So far as I know the Buddhists were the first to use
the words prapancopasamam sivam.
12.
Compare Nagarjuna's karika, "anirodhamanutpadam" in
Madhyamikavrtti, B.T.S., p. 3.
13.
Compare Madhyamikakarika, B.T.S., p. 3, anekartham
ananartham, etc.
14.
Compare Lankavatarasutra, p. 78, Advayasamsaraparinirvanavatsarvadharmah
tasmat tarhi mahamate Sunyatanutpadadvayanihsvabhavalaksane
yogah karaniyah; also 8, 46, Yaduta svacittavisayavikalpadrstyanavabodhanat
vijnananam svacittadrsyamatranavatarena mahamate valaprthagjanah
bhavabhavasvabhavaparamarthadrstidvayavadino bhavanti.
15.
Compare Nagarjuna's karika, B.T.S., p 196, Akasami
sasarnganca bandhyayah putra eva ca asantascabhivyajyante
tathabhavena kalpana, with Gaudapada's karika, III.
28, Asato mayaya janma tatvato naiva jayate bandhyaputro
na tattvena mayaya vapi jayate.
16.
The very name Alatasanti is absolutely Buddhistic. Compare
Nagarjuna's karika, B.T.S, p. 206, where he quotes
a verse from the Sataka.
17.
The use of the word dharma in the sense of appearance
or entity is peculiarly Buddhistic. The Hindu sense
is that given by Jaimini, "Codanalaksanah arthah, darmah."
Dharma is determined by the injunctions of the Vedas.
See
our page Advaita
Vedanta for more information on this topic including
book recommendations and links to other articles.
This
page was published on May 13, 2001.
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